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Abstract. We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which
different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different
outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence
of envy, but this can be incompatible with reservation utilities. It is possible
that Alice’s envy of Bob’s assignment cannot be remedied without violating Bob’s
participation constraint. Instead, we seek to rule out justified envy, defined as envy
for which a remedy would not violate any agent’s participation constraint. We
show that fairness, meaning the absence of justified envy, can be achieved together
with efficiency and individual rationality. We introduce a competitive equilibrium
approach with price-dependent incomes obtaining the desired properties.
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21. Introduction
We investigate the meaning of fairness in allocation environments with participa-
tion constraints and constrained consumption spaces. A special case is the random
allocation problem in which agents have unit demand. Without participation con-
straints, we may regard all agents equally, and the absence of envy is a natural
notion of fairness. In our model, different agents may have different reservation util-
ities, stemming from outside options or property rights. Participation constraints
ensure that agents get at least their reservation utilities. Absence of envy may be
incompatible with agents’ participation constraints. In such environments, what
does it mean to treat agents fairly?
It is well known that allocations satisfying both efficiency and envy-freeness exist
(Varian, 1974; Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979). In a model with participation con-
straints, the challenge is to make efficient and envy-free allocations compatible with
agents’ individual rationality. Our contribution is threefold. Our first contribution
is to propose a notion of fairness that combines envy and individual rationality. We
prove (Theorem 1) the existence of fair, efficient, and individually rational alloca-
tions. Our second contribution is to show that these fair and efficient outcomes can,
under certain conditions, be viewed as market outcomes (Theorem 2), as in Varian
and Hylland-Zeckhauser. Our third contribution (Theorem 3) is to accommodate
quantitative constraints, such as those in course allocations (e.g all students must
take at least two math courses), or controlled school choice (e.g a school seeks certain
diversity objectives).
We understand fairness as the absence of justified envy, or as “ruling out envy
that can be remedied within agents’ individual rationality constraints.” We do not
want to say that an outcome is unfair if its unfairness can be traced to differences
in agents’ reservation utilities. Concretely, Alice envies Bob at an allocation x if she
would rather have Bob’s assignment in x than hers. To decide whether this envy
is justified, we consider the possibility of swapping the assignments between Alice
and Bob, since swapping is an obvious remedy for Alice’s envy. We say that Alice’s
envy is justified if Bob could have received Alice’s assignment without violating his
participation constraint, and unjustified if Alice’s assignment would put Bob below
his reservation utility.1
1Our fairness notion is similar to the concepts introduced by Yılmaz (2010) and
Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2011) for object allocation problems with ordinal preferences.
See Section 2 for a discussion.
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Our notion of envy presumes that the obvious remedy for Alice’s envy towards
Bob is for them to switch assignments. Clearly, if Alice wants to bring the matter to
court, the most natural and plausible remedy she could offer is for the two of them
to switch assignments. One might devise more complicated remedies, with a fuller
reallocation that would seek to eliminate Alice’s envy, but these would necessarily
be complicated and require Alice’s complaint to rely on multiple agents. That said,
our methods do accommodate more general remedies (Theorem 4).
Importantly, our notion of fairness is compatible with efficiency. We show that,
under some conditions, our solution can be achieved as a market outcome. The idea
seeks to generalize Varian’s and Hylland and Zeckhauser’s competitive equilibrium
from equal incomes. The obvious solution would be to endogenize incomes. To this
end, we construct price-dependent income functions. We have to be careful since,
as shown by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), when incomes depend on prices, a
Walrasian equilibrium might not exist. Our careful construction of income functions
ensures individual rationality and fairness. This construction could be regarded as
a minimal deviation from equal incomes that sustains individual rationality and no
satiated agent overspending. If Alice envies Bob, then Bob’s maximum achievable
utility is his reservation utility (Lemma 4). Besides, if Alice has less money than Bob
and she does not envy him, then she has just enough money to reach satiation. We
provide an informal description of the income-function construction in Section 4.2.
We organize the paper as follows. We discuss related literature in Section 2,
present our model and fairness notion in Section 3, and present main theorems in
Section 4. We extend our theorems to allocation environments with constraints in
Section 5, and show that our theorems can account for more general remedies for
envy in Section 6. In Section 7 we apply our result to school choice.
2. Related literature
Efficiency and fairness can be achieved in models without reservation utilities.
Examples are the solutions of Varian (1974), Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) and
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001). Our problem is complicated, both conceptually
and technically, by individual rationality constraints. Conceptually, the meaning
of fairness among unequal agents is not obvious, while technically, implementation
through market equilibrium may not be possible in economies with price-dependent
incomes (see Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979)). Part of our contribution is to support
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fair, efficient and individually rational (IR) outcomes as competitive pseudo-market
equilibria, as in Hylland-Zeckhauser.
Our notion of no justified envy is analogous to similar notions developed by Yılmaz
(2010) and Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2011). They assume that agents have
ordinal preferences instead of cardinal utilities, and say that agent i justifiably envies
agent j if i does not regard her allocation as first-order stochastically dominating j’s,
while any object with positive probability in her allocation is acceptable to j. Yilmaz
considers the house allocation with existing tenants model in which some agents
have deterministic endowments. He focuses on extending the probabilistic serial
rule (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001). Athanassoglou and Sethuraman consider the
fractional endowment environment. Their purpose is to extend Yilmaz’s mechanism
and fairness notion. We work with cardinal utility, focus on market equilibrium
instead of probabilistic serial, and use very different techniques. But we share some
conceptual similarities with them that extend beyond the similarity in the definition
of justified envy. These authors suggest a cake-eating algorithm that starts with all
agents eating at the same speed, but when an agent is at risk of violating her IR
constraint, only this agent has the right to eat, until she reaches her reservation
utility or drops out of the algorithm. So only when IR binds for some agent is
she allowed to eat at higher speed than the others. In our competitive equilibrium
method (see Theorem 2), our income functions seek to achieve similar ideas. Fairness
pushes us towards equal incomes, but IR forces us to accept some inequality.
Schmeidler and Vind (1972) consider a model where IR constraints arise due to
the presence of endowments. Starting from an initial endowment, they study fair
net trades : trades leading to a Pareto optimal allocation in which no agent envies
the trades made by others. Our model differs from theirs for two reasons. First,
our model is primarily designed to address constrained consumption spaces, as in
the random allocation problem. Fair net trades may not be feasible in such en-
vironments, leading to a weak notion of fairness. Specifically, under unit demand
constraints there is no reason that one agent’s net trade is feasible to any other
agent.2 Second, while reservation utilities in our model can arise due to the pres-
ence of endowments, they may also stem from other sources.
2Suppose Bob is endowed with 1/3 of good 1 and gets all of it; Alice is endowed with 2/3 of
good 1. Then Alice can never envy Bob’s net trade, as adding Bob’s net trade to her endowment,
2/3+(1−1/3)> 1, violates her unit demand constraint. Schmeidler and Vindt’s notion was never
meant to be used in (what we term) random allocation problems.
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In the fractional endowment model, Yu and Zhang (2019) propose algorithms that
generalize Top Trading Cycle to organize endowment exchange. Their algorithms
find ordinally efficient, fair and individually rational allocations. We differ not only
in the use of cardinal utilities but also in the absence of preexisting endowments.
Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019) explore the role of endowments for discrete al-
location problems. Different from us, they interpret endowments as the rights to
exclude others, and propose a new cooperative game solution concept. Although
they allow for public ownership, or collective ownership by subgroups, endowments
in their model are deterministic. As a result, their results are unrelated to ours.
Our results are applicable to school choice when we wish to use endowments
instead of priorities to control children’s rights towards schools. It is in particular
applicable to controlled school choice. School choice was first introduced as an appli-
cation of resource allocation models by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003). In the
standard model of school choice, fairness and efficiency are generally incompatible. A
lot of the school choice literature has been devoted to the resulting trade-off. In our
solution, the trade-off is resolved. Hamada, Hsu, Kurata, Suzuki, Ueda, and Yokoo
(2017) is the only paper we are aware of that emphasizes endowments in school
choice. They assume that each child owns one seat of some school as endow-
ment. Their goal is to design strategy-proof allocation mechanisms to meet the
distributional constraint in the market and IR constraint of each child. Since they
consider deterministic endowments and ordinal preferences, and their fairness no-
tions are based on priorities, their results are unrelated to ours. The constraints
we analyze have been discussed extensively in the literature on controlled school
choice: see Ehlers (2010), Kojima (2012), Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2013),
Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2014), and Echenique and Yenmez (2015);
and the literature on distributional constraints (motivated by geographic distribu-
tional considerations): Kamada and Kojima (2015), Kamada and Kojima (2017),
and Kamada and Kojima (2019), among others. Our approach of eliminating jus-
tified envy when it does not conflict with constraints is common to those papers.
For example, Kamada and Kojima consider matchings where no blocking pair that
would not violate distributional constraints are present.
In separate work (Echenique, Miralles, and Zhang, 2019), we give a direct Wal-
rasian approach to allocation problems with constraints. Key is the idea of setting
a price for each constraint. We properly embed constraint prices into each agent’s
budget constraint.
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3. The model
3.1. Notation and preliminary definitions. Each agent i has an associated max-
imum overall demand ci ∈ R++. We define the c
i-simplex in Rn as {x ∈ Rn+ :∑n
j=1 xj = c
i}, denoted by ∆n(ci) ⊆ Rn. The set {x ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
j=1 xj ≤ c
i} is
denoted by ∆n−(c
i). When n is understood, we simply use the notation ∆(ci) and
∆−(c
i). We shall use the shortened notation C i = ∆−(c
i) for agent i’s consumption
space. When ci = 1 for all i, we say that agents have unit demand, and that we are
facing a random allocation problem. For ci large enough for all i, the allocation prob-
lem is indistinguishable from a standard exchange economy, where the consumption
space is Rn+.
We adopt the notational conventions used in convex analysis: Denote by R∗ =
R ∪ {−∞} the extended real numbers. A function u : Rn → R∗ has domain
C = {x ∈ Rn : u(x) > −∞}.3 A function u : Rn → R is
• quasi-concave if {z ∈ Rn : u(z) ≥ u(x)} is a convex set, for all x ∈ Rn.
• concave if, for any x, z ∈ Rn, and λ ∈ (0, 1), λu(z) + (1 − λ)u(x) ≤ u(λz +
(1− λ)x);
• linear if we can identify u(·) with a vector v ∈ Rn, so that u(x) = v ·x on the
domain of u. For random allocation problems, linear utility is interpreted as
an expected utility function.
• Lipschitz continuous with constant θ > 0 if for any x, z ∈ C, |u(z)−u(x)| <
θ‖z − x‖.
• satisfying the Inada property (at the axes) if, for any x in its domain, u(x) =
u(0), unless x≫ 0.
• has l as its favorite object if, on its domain, decreasing consumption of any
object k 6= l by any amount ǫ > 0 in favor of an increased consumption of ǫ
of object l always leads to an increase in u. For example, if u is differentiable
and C = Rn++, then l is a favorite object if
∂u(x)
∂xl
> ∂u(x)
∂xk
, ∀k 6= l. If u is linear,
identified with v ∈ Rn, then vl > vk, ∀k 6= l.
Throughout we work with functions that have a closed and convex domain. A
function u with domain C is said to be continuous, and monotone if it is continuous
(in the relative topology on C) at every point x ∈ C, and for any x, y ∈ C, x < y
implies that u(x) < u(y).
3We use the conventions that are standard in convex analysis. Note that x+(−∞) = −∞, and
λ · (−∞) = −∞ for any scalar λ.
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3.2. Model. A finite set of agents are to be assigned a finite set of objects. We
assume that objects are perfectly divisible. In the random allocation problem, we
would be allocating probabilities, and preferences would be defined on the set of
probability distributions.
An allocation problem is a tuple Γ = {O, I,Q, (ci, ui, u˜i)i∈I}, where:
• O = {1, . . . , L} represents a set of objects, or goods.
• I = {1, . . . , N} represents a set of agents.
• Q = (ql)l∈O is a capacity vector, and ql ∈ R++ is the quantity of object l.
We assume that
∑
l∈O ql ≤
∑
i∈I c
i (no overall excess supply.)
• For each agent i, ci > 0 determines her maximum overall demand. Her
consumption space is C i = ∆−(c
i).
• For each agent i, ui : Rn → R∗ is a continuous and monotone utility function
with C i as its domain.
• For each agent i, u˜i ∈ R is her reservation utility.
We say that Γ admits a common favorite object if there is an object l that is a
favorite object for every agent i.
3.3. Allocations. An allocation in Γ is a vector x ∈ RLN+ , which we write as
x = (xi)Ni=1, such that
xi ∈ C i for all i ∈ I, and
∑
i∈I
xil = ql for all l ∈ O.
Let A be the set of all allocations. Clearly, A is nonempty, compact and convex.
In the random allocation problem, where
∑
l ql = N , each agent’s assignment
is a probability distribution over O. When xil ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ I and all l ∈
O, x is a deterministic allocation. The Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem (Birkhoff,
1946; Von Neumann, 1953) implies that every allocation is a convex combination of
deterministic allocations.
3.4. Individual rationality and Pareto optimality. An allocation x is accept-
able to agent i if ui(xi) ≥ u˜i; x is individually rational (IR) if it is acceptable to all
agents.
We assume that reservation utilities are such that an IR allocation exists. We say
that Γ admits a strictly positive IR allocation if there is an IR allocation x˜ ∈ RLN++.
All agents obtain strictly positive quantities of all goods in x˜.4
4A sufficient condition for this is the existence of an allocation x with ui(xi) > u˜i for all i ∈ I.
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An allocation x is weakly Pareto optimal (wPO) if there is no allocation y such
that ui(yi) > ui(xi) for all i. An allocation x is Pareto optimal (PO) if there is no
allocation y such that ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi) for all i with at least one strict inequality.
Given the bounded consumption spaces in our model, wPO is compatible with
wasteful situations where one can use existing resources to make some agents strictly
better off, but cannot make all agents strictly better off because some agents are
satiated.
3.5. Fairness. We regard agents as having the right to attain their reservation
utilities. While typically reservation utilities arise from endowments, we do not
consider endowments as the only source. Guaranteed reservation utilities can arise
from a policy that protects disavantaged groups in school choice, for example.
Our notion of fairness rules out envy that cannot be justified by guaranteed reser-
vation utilities. If an agent i envies another agent j at an allocation x (that is, i
prefers xj to xi), our fairness notion regards the envy as not justified if switching
their allocations would violate j’s participation constraint.
Formally, we say that an agent i has justified envy towards another agent j at an
allocation x if
ui(xj) > ui(xi) and uj(xi) ≥ u˜j,
and the justified envy is said to be strong if uj(xi) > u˜j. In words, if i envies j and
j could have received i’s assignment without violating j’s participation constraint,
the envy is justified.
We say that x has no (strong) justified envy (N(S)JE) if no agent has (strong)
justified envy towards any other agent at x.
Fairness as NJE provides defense against possible complaints. Imagine a social
planner that proposes an IR allocation x. Suppose an agent i complains that she
envies another agent j. An obvious remedy for i’s complaint is a pairwise switch of
their assignments. But if the envy is not justified, the planner’s response is that the
switch would violate j’s right to attain her reservation utility.
Of course, one may imagine complaints that could be remedied through rear-
rangements more complicated than a pairwise switch. Such remedies may or may
not be realistic, but in any case our methods easily accommodate much more gen-
eral remedies. Specifically, one can devise cyclic rearrangements, where arbitrarily
long sequences of agents collaborate in the satisfaction of an agent’s envy, as long
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as the last agent’s participation constraint is not violated. Theorem 4 in Section 6.1
extends our main result to cover this case.
In an IR and NJE allocation x, if ui = uj and u˜i ≥ u˜j, then it must be that
ui(xi) ≥ uj(xj). That is, if i and j have equal preferences and i’s reservation
utility is weakly higher than j’s, then both agree that i’s assignment in x is also
weakly better than j’s. In particular, if ui = uj and u˜i = u˜j, then it must be that
ui(xi) = uj(xj). So NJE and IR imply equal treatment of equals (called symmetry
by Zhou (1990)).
3.6. Approximation. Our main results will prove that there exist allocations that
satisfy individual rationality, Pareto optimality, and no justified envy. More pre-
cisely, some of our results are based on approximations of these properties: for any
ε > 0, an allocation x satisfies
• ε-individual rationality (ε-IR) if ui(xi) ≥ u˜i − ε for all i ∈ I;
• ε-Pareto optimality (ε-PO) if there is no allocation y such that ui(yi) >
ui(xi) + ε for all i ∈ I.
• no ε-justified envy (ε-NJE) if there do not exist two distinct agents i, j such
that ui(xj) > ui(xi) and uj(xi) > u˜j − ε.
It is clear that ε-IR is weaker than IR, ε-PO is weaker than wPO, and ε-NJE is
stronger than NJE.
4. Main results
Let Γ = {O, I,Q, (ci, ui, u˜i)i∈I} be an allocation problem under the assumptions
specified above (that is, utility functions are continuous and monotone, and there
exists an IR allocation).
Theorem 1. Suppose that agents’ utility functions in Γ are concave.
(1) For any ε > 0, there exists an allocation that is ε-individually rational, ε-
Pareto optimal and has no ε-justified envy;
(2) There exists an allocation that is individually rational, weak Pareto optimal
and has no strong justified envy.
(3) If utilities are linear, there exists an allocation that is individually rational,
Pareto optimal and has no strong justified envy.
Theorem 1 gives the existence of allocations with the desired properties of ef-
ficiency, fairness, and individual rationality. Our next result gives a competitive
market foundation for these allocations.
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Theorem 2. Suppose that agents’ utility functions are quasi-concave, and that at
least one the following conditions hold:
•
∑
l∈O ql < mini c
i (ci is sufficiently large for every i ∈ I).
• ui satisfies the Inada property and u˜i > ui(0), for every i ∈ I.
• There exists a common favorite object, and a strictly positive IR allocation.
Then there exists continuous income functionsmi : ∆→ R+ and (x, p) = ((x
i)Ni=1, p),
such that p ∈ ∆ is a price vector, and
(1)
∑
i x
i = Q (x is an allocation; or, “supply equals demand”).
(2) x is individually rational, Pareto optimal and has no justified envy.
(3) xi ∈ argmax{ui(zi) : zi ∈ C i and p · zi ≤ mi(p)}.
Theorem 2 provides conditions under which a fair, efficient, and IR allocation
exists and can be supported as a form of market equilibrium (a “pseudo-market”).
Our equilibria generalize Hylland and Zeckhauser’s, or Varian’s, notion of equilib-
rium with a fixed exogenous income. Here, income is not fixed. It is price dependent,
and formulated through income functions mi. These are carefully calibrated to en-
sure both IR and NJE.
Theorem 2 allows us to improve on Theorem 1. When utilities are Lipschitz,
quasi-concavity is sufficient.
Corollary 1. If ui is quasi-concave and Lipschitz continuous for every i ∈ I, there
is an allocation that is individually rational, weak Pareto optimal and has no strong
justified envy.
The connection between the two theorems is worth clarifying. We prove the third
statement of Theorem 1 using Theorem 2. The first two statements of Theorem 1
have very different proofs, and can accommodate quantity constraints; See Section 5.
Finally, the two theorems hold without change if we use a stronger notion of NJE
that does not rely on pairwise switch as the remedy for envy; See Section 6.1.
4.1. Remarks on Theorem 1. Statements (1) and (2) of Theorem 1 are based on
weighted utilitarian maximization. We study the problem of maximizing
(1)
∑
i∈I
λiui(xi)
over all IR allocations x, for each fixed vector λ = (λ1, . . . , λN) of welfare weights.
The trick is to find “fair” welfare weights. Ideally, one could proceed iteratively.
For each λ, solve the weighted utilitarian maximization problem and check if there
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is any justified envy. If i justifiedly envies j, then adjust λ so as to decrease λj and
increase λi. Yet the iterative procedure does not quite work. We use a related idea,
based on the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz (KKM) lemma.
The KKM lemma was used by Varian (1974) in proving the existence of Pareto-
efficient allocations with no envy whatsoever. Varian does not consider participa-
tion constraints, and works directly with allocations (more precisely, with the utility
possibility frontier). Our approach using welfare weights (inspired by the Negishi
approach to equilibrium existence), is quite different. Participation constraints in-
troduce some technical difficulties, which necessitates an approximation argument.
The presence of ε > 0 in the IR, efficiency and NJE properties are consequences of
our approximation argument.
We briefly explain our use of the KKM lemma. Suppose there is a collection of
closed sets, each one identified with a vertex of the simplex. Suppose that each face
of the simplex is covered by the union of the sets identified with the vertices of such
face. (Notice that the simplex is also a face of itself.) The KKM lemma says that
such a collection of sets has non-empty intersection. In the proof of Theorem 1,
we identify the simplex with the set of welfare weights λ. Thus each vertex of
the simplex is the result of putting all weight on one agent in solving (1). Each
set Λi corresponds to the set of weights yielding an ε-Pareto optimal allocation in
which 1) agent i does not have ε-justified envy towards any other agent and 2) ε-
individually rationality holds for agent i. We show that the collection (Λi)i∈I meets
the conditions of the KKM lemma. Any point in the intersection of (Λi)i∈I meets
the properties in the first statement of the theorem.
By taking the limit when ε → 0, we obtain the second statement of Theorem 1.
Observe that we only conclude that the obtained allocation is wPO. This is irrele-
vant in many allocation problems, in which wPO and PO are identical. There are
environments, however, in which there is no such equivalence. Market design prob-
lems in which the consumption spaces are bounded (say, because of unit demand)
constitute one example.
4.2. Remarks on Theorem 2. The use of competitive markets to achieve a fair
and efficient allocation is inspired by Varian (1974) and Hylland and Zeckhauser
(1979), and more recently by Miralles and Pycia (2014), who establish a Second
Welfare Theorem for the kind of allocation problems studied in our paper.
Varian and Hylland-Zeckhauser use fixed and equal incomes for all agents. The
first complication in our paper is that equal incomes will, however, not respect
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reservation utilities. Incomes must be price-dependent and constructed to satisfy
IR and ensure NJE.5 Our model suggests a “minimal departure” from equal incomes
that satisfies IR: We allow an agent to have above-average income only in order to
obtain exactly her reservation utility. A second complication is that a competitive
equilibrium allocation with potentially satiated agents does not guarantee Pareto-
optimality, unless expenses for satiated agents are minimal (Hylland and Zeckhauser,
1979). For this reason, we force an agent’s income below average whenever the av-
erage lies above the minimal income providing her with satiation.
The main new idea in the proof of Theorem 2 lies in the construction of price-
dependent incomes. The construction is done by, for each price vector, taking the
median of three magnitudes: 1) a common income level, 2) the minimum expenditure
guaranteeing satiation, and 3) the minimum expenditure ensuring reservation utility.
Agents’ incomes add up to the overall value of objects. An important property of
our construction is that, when i’s income is higher than j’s, and j is not satiated,
then i’s income must be equal to the minimum expenditure ensuring her reservation
utility. This naturally establishes no justified envy: If agent j envies i, then j must
have less equilibrium income than i, so that i must find j’s allocation unacceptable.
Finally, it is clear that IR is ensured, since no agent’s income lies below the minimum
expenditure ensuring her reservation utility.
Once income functions are in place, existence follows standard ideas: first show-
ing the existence of quasi-equilibrium (as in e.g Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green, et al.
(1995), chapter 17, appendix B), and then exploiting the conditions stated in the
theorem to bridge the gap between quasi-equilibrium and competitive equilibrium.
To this end, the conditions stated in the theorem play a technical role. They serve
to ensure that either all prices or incomes are strictly positive for all agents. The
first condition consists of virtually unbounded (above) consumption spaces.6 The
second condition considers preferences for strictly positive bundles alongside with
reservation utility above the minimal level. The third condition is based on the
existence of a common favorite object, and a strictly positive IR allocation. The
resulting allocation guarantees all the desired properties in their strongest sense.
5When reservation utility arises from agents’ endowments, one may be tempted to use Wal-
rasian incomes. These are, of course, price dependent, and ensure IR. Unfortunately, there are
simple examples of allocation problems with endowments where no Walrasian equilibria exist
(Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979). See Echenique, Miralles, and Zhang (2019) for a discussion.
6A corollary is that if the consumption space is RL+ for all agents, then our Walrasian approach
obtains an allocation that is Pareto optimal, IR and has no justified envy.
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Similarly, Lipschitz continuity in Corollary 1 is also a technical condition, ensuring
that we can easily create an (arbitrarily) low amount of an artificial favorite good.
Existence of a common favorite object is a restrictive assumption. The corollary
works by extending an economy with the addition of an artificial common favorite
good. Lipschitz continuity is needed in order to facilitate such inclusion. We take
the limit when the supply of the artificial good tends to zero, obtaining the limit of
a sequence of Pareto optimal allocations.
The addition of an artificial favorite good also lies behind the proof of State-
ment (3) in Theorem 1. With linear (or expected) utility functions, the set of
Pareto optimal allocations is closed in the amount of the artificial good. Hence, the
limit allocation is also Pareto optimal.
5. Efficient and fair assignment under constraints
Many allocation problems require allocations to satisfy certain quantitative con-
straints. It is easy to adapt our model and results to such situations. In Sec-
tion 5.1, we take a set AC ⊆ A as the primitive and interpret it as the set of
allocations that comply with some given collection of constraints. AC is closed and
convex, and we implicitly assume that the behind constraints satisfy the condition of
Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2013), which ensures that every feasible allo-
cation can be achieved as randomized deterministic feasible allocations. We discuss
several examples of explicit constraints in Section 5.2.
5.1. Constrained allocations. Given a set of feasible allocations AC ⊆ A, the
definition of individual rationality is same as before. We assume that there exists
an IR allocation in AC. The definition of efficiency extends naturally to AC. An
allocation x ∈ AC is Pareto optimal if there is no allocation y ∈ AC such that
ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi) for all i ∈ I with strict inequality for some agent; x is weak Pareto
optimal (wPO) if there is no allocation y ∈ AC such that ui(yi) > ui(xi) for all i ∈ I;
and x is ε-Pareto optimal (ε-PO), for any ε > 0, if there is no allocation y ∈ AC
such that ui(yi) > ui(xi) + ε for all i ∈ I.
Until now, i’s envy towards j is negated if switching their assignments violates the
participation constraint of j. Now, additional constraints provide another reason for
negating i’s envy: switching their assignments may not be feasible because it violates
some constraints. To formalize this idea, let xi↔j denote the allocation obtained by
switching the assignments of i and j in an allocation x; that is, xii↔j = x
j , xji↔j = x
i,
and xki↔j = x
k for all k ∈ I \ {i, j}. An agent i has justified envy towards another
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agent j at an allocation x ∈ AC if
ui(xj) > ui(xi), uj(xi) ≥ u˜j and xi↔j ∈ A
C.
Under the new definition, no justified envy may no longer be compatible with effi-
ciency and individual rationality. To overcome this difficulty, we classify agents into
disjoint types. Informally, think of i and j as being of equal type if the constraints
behind AC do not distinguish between them. We identify agents’ types by checking
whether switching their assignments in any feasible allocation is still feasible. We
then prove that fairness among agents of equal type is compatible with efficiency
and individual rationality.
Formally, we say two agents i, j are of equal type, denoted by i ∼ j, if for all
x ∈ AC, xi↔j ∈ A
C. The binary relation ∼ is reflexive and transitive.7 Hence it
partitions I into disjoint types. Then we say i has equal-type justified envy towards
j at an allocation x ∈ AC if i has justified envy towards j, and i, j are of equal type.
We say that x has no equal-type justified envy if no agent has equal-type justified
envy towards any other agent. No strong equal-type justified envy and no equal-type
ǫ-justified envy are defined in a similar way by stating that the relevant envy is
absent in the allocation.
With the above definitions, we extend the first two statements of Theorem 1 to
accommodate constraints.
Theorem 3. Suppose that agents’ utility functions are concave.
(1) For any ε > 0, there exists an allocation that is ε-individually rational, ε-
Pareto optimal and has no equal-type ε-justified envy;
(2) There exists an allocation that is individually rational, weak Pareto optimal
and has no strong equal-type justified envy.
We say that the implicit constraints behind AC are anonymous if all agents are
identified to be of equal type. The model in Section 3 is one where constraints are
anonymous since AC = A.
5.2. Constraint structures. It is often most useful to explicitly model the source
of types and constraints. For example, types can arise from definitions of socio-
economic status, or racial and ethnic classifications. Following the approach of
Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2013), we define a general constraint structure,
7 Suppose i ∼ j ∼ k. For all x ∈ AC , xi↔k = [(xi↔j)j↔k]i↔j . i ∼ j implies that xi↔j ∈ AC ,
j ∼ k implies that (xi↔j)j↔k ∈ AC , and i ∼ j implies that [(xi↔j)j↔k ]i↔j ∈ AC . So xi↔k ∈ AC .
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and then discuss some examples in which an exogenous collection of types gives rise
to constrained allocations.
A constraint [H, (q
H
, q¯H)] consists of a set H ⊆ I × O and a pair of integers
(q
H
, q¯H) with q
H
≤ q¯H . Given a collection H of constraints, we define
AH =
{
x ∈ A : q
H
≤
∑
(i,l)∈H
xil ≤ q¯H for all [H, (qH , q¯H)] ∈ H
}
as the set of feasible allocations satisfying H.
The first example is controlled school choice in which the set of students I are
partitioned into disjoint subsets T1, . . . , TK (which are interpreted as types), and
for each school l, the desirable number of type k students where k ∈ {1, . . . , K} is
between q
l,k
and q¯l,k. So for each school l and each type k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, we have a
constraint [
Tk × {l}, (ql,k, q¯l,k)
]
.
Theorem 3 says that there is an efficient and individually rational allocation that
achieves fairness within each type.
The second example is the collection of distributional constraints studied by
Kamada and Kojima (2015, 2017). In that collection, every constraint is of the
form [
I ×O′, (0, q¯O′)
]
where agents are doctors and O′ ⊆ O is the set of hospitals in a geographic region
(a city or a prefecture). The collection of constraints is anonymous because each
constraint does not distinguish between the identities of doctors. In general, a
collection H is anonymous if for every constraint [H, (q
H
, q¯H)] ∈ H, H is of the
form I × O′ for some O′ ⊆ O. Theorem 3 implies that for anonymous constraints,
there is an efficient and individually rational allocation that achieves fairness among
any two agents.
In the last example, H consists of individual constraints, which impose restric-
tions on each individual’s assignment. In our model of Section 3, we have already
encountered the N individual constraints: [{i}×O, (0, ci)] for each i ∈ I. Formally,
H consists of Hi where each Hi further consists of constraints of the form
[{i} × O′, (q
i,O′
, q¯i,O′)]
with O′ ⊆ O. For example, in course allocation if a student i has to take at least one
math course but no more than three math courses, we can impose the constraint
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[{i} × O′, (1, 3)] where O′ is the set of math courses. Theorem 3 says that we can
achieve fairness among agents of equal individual constraints.
6. Discussion
6.1. Justified envy by exchange. Our notion of NJE relies on pairwise switch
as being the remedy for envy. We think of such switch as natural. But if pairwise
switch is seen as limited, it is important to note that our result is, in fact, easily
generalized to allow for more general remedies.
Let us think of envy that can be addressed by carrying out a chain of exchanges,
each agent giving up her assignment in favor of an agent who envies her, and the
last agent in the exchange being given the assignment of the first agent. If this
reallocation does not violate the last agent’s participation constraint, then the envy
is justified.
Formally, agent i has justified envy by exchange towards agent j at allocation x
if there exists a sequence of distinct agents (ik)
K
k=1 with
• i1 = i and i2 = j;
• ik envies ik+1, 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1;
• and uiK (xi1) ≥ u˜iK .
The idea is that i could conjure a remedy for her envy towards j by proposing a
coalition of agents and a reallocation of their assignments, such that all are made
better off, with the possible exception of one agent whose participation constraint
is not violated. We define strong justified envy by exchange and ε-justified envy by
exchange similarly as before. We prove that our main theorems hold without change
under this extended fairness notion.
Theorem 4. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 hold without change if no (ε-/strong) jus-
tified envy is replaced by no (ε-/strong) justified envy by exchange.
6.2. An example of envy between agents of equal endowment in an allo-
cation of no justified envy. It is natural to think of endowments as a source for
reservation utility. In this subsection, we present an example of a discrete allocation
problem in which one agent envies another agent in an allocation that is individu-
ally rational, Pareto optimal, and satisfies NJE, even though the two agents have
equal endowments. The punchline is that the two agents have different preferences,
so that they play very different roles in the economy. Other agents “trade” with
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them, and as a result one of them ends up being more useful than the other to the
remaining agents. The outcome implies the presence of envy.
The example also suggests that our solution may fail to be incentive compatible.
We have not specified a selection mechanism, and opted not to discuss incentives
and strategy-proofness, but the example conveys some insights. One agent envies
another even though they have equal endowments. This fact suggests that one
agent may want to pretend to be the agent that he envies. In a large economy in
which the number of agents who report each type of preference does not change
very much after a misreport, it stands to reason that such a misreport would not be
profitable. Of course, the example falls short of proving that if we were to define a
fair mechanism it would not be strategy proof.
Example 1. Consider five agents {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and three objects {a, b, c}. There are
two copies of objects b and c, but only one copy of object a. Agents have linear
utility functions. Their von-Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities and endowments
are described in Table 1. Observe that agents 1 and 2 have identical endowments.
i uia u
i
b u
i
c
1 3 1 2
2 3 2 1
3 2 3 1
4 2 3 1
5 2 3 1
(a) Utilities
i ωia ω
i
b ω
i
c
1 0 1 0
2 0 1 0
3 1/3 0 2/3
4 1/3 0 2/3
5 1/3 0 2/3
(b) Endowments
i xia x
i
b x
i
c
1 0 0 1
2 1/2 0 1/2
3 1/6 2/3 1/6
4 1/6 2/3 1/6
5 1/6 2/3 1/6
(c) Allocation x
Table 1. Example 1
Consider the allocation x in the same table. Agent 1 envies agent 2 at x because
u1 · x1 = 2 < 3/2 + 2/2 = u1 · x2.
The envy is not justified, however, because
u2 · x1 = 1 < 2 = u2 · ω2.
In fact, it is easy to see that x has no justified envy, and is individually rational
and Pareto optimal. In any PO allocation y, we cannot have y1b > 0, as agent 1 and
any agent j ∈ {3, 4, 5} are willing to trade b for any other object. So y1 must be
a convex combination of (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1). To make agent 1 better off then we
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would need to give agent 1 some shares of a, but these can only come at the expense
of agent 2. To make agent 2 better off, she would need to get more shares of a, but
these can only come at the expense of agents 3, 4 and 5. These agents could only
exchange shares of a for shares of b, which agent 2 does not have. All agents rank
objects a and c in the same way.
7. Application to school choice
School choice is the problem of allocating children to schools when we want to take
into account children’s (or their parents’) preferences (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez,
2003). In the last 15 years, several large US school districts have implemented
school choice programs that follow economists’ recommendation and are based on
economic theory.8 Practical implementation of school choice programs presents us
with a number of lessons and challenges.
The first lesson is that school choice should be guided by fairness, or lack of
justified envy. When given the choice of implementing either a fair or an efficient out-
come, school districts have consistently chosen fairness (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, Roth, and So¨nmez,
2005; Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005). One reason could be that district
administrators are concerned with litigation: If Alice envies Bob’s school, then the
district can invoke justified envy to argue as a defense that Bob had a higher priority
than Alice at the school.9 It is also likely that district administrators, and society
as a whole, have an intrinsic preference for fairness, and the preference is strong
enough to outweigh concerns over efficiency.
The second lesson is that school districts want to give some children certain rights,
like the right to attend a neighborhood school, or the right to go to the same school
as an older sibling. In the current practice, such rights are achieved by giving
children different priorities. Priorities seem simple, but they are not transparent:
Priorities do not translate immediately into allocation outcomes. Alice may have
a good priority in one school, but her chance of getting into the school depends
on all students’ choices and priorities, not only on her priority at the school. This
is especially true when priorities are coarse, which is common in practice.10 Also,
8Boston (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003; Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, Roth, and So¨nmez,
2005), New York (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005), and Chicago (Pathak and So¨nmez,
2013) are leading examples.
9Observe that this notion of justified envy is pairwise, as is ours.
10In school choice with coarse priorities, we can prove that it is computationally hard to deter-
mine if a given student will be assigned a given school.
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the ordering of students in a priority may not reflect their “rights” at the school.
Below we construct an example in which if two students switch priorities at one
school, the student who climbs up in the priority ends with a worse outcome in the
student-optimal stable matching.
Example 2. Consider three schools {a, b, c} and three children {1, 2, 3}. Suppose
that school priorities, and children preferences are as follows.
a b c
2 2 3
3 3 1
1 1 2
1 2 3
b a a
c b c
a c b
Then the student-optimal stable matching is µ(1) = b, µ(2) = a and µ(3) = c.
If 1 and 2 switch roles in the priority ranking of school a, then the student-optimal
stable matching becomes µ(1) = c, µ(2) = b and µ(3) = a. So 1 becomes worse off.
The trick here is that when 1 and 2 switch roles, they also change their positions
relative to 3. The message of the example is that justified envy, a “pairwise” concept
in school choice, cannot rely on the relative position in schools’ priorities of the pair
in question.
The third lesson is that school districts have demonstrated a strong preference for
controlling the racial and socio-economic composition of their schools: so-called con-
trolled school choice. A common critique of existing school choice programs is that
they have led to undesirable school compositions. For example, in Boston, schools
have been left with too few neighborhood children, which has motivated a move away
from the system recommended by economists (Dur, Kominers, Pathak, and So¨nmez,
2017). In New York City, the new school choice system exhibits high degrees of racial
segregation. Segregation in NYC schools is not new, but the complaint is that the
new school choice program may have made it worse, and certainly has not helped.
In the words of a recent New York Times article “. . . school choice has not delivered
on a central promise: to give every student a real chance to attend a good school.
Fourteen years into the system, black and Hispanic students are just as isolated in
segregated high schools as they are in elementary schools — a situation that school
choice was supposed to ease.”11 The article points to a dissatisfaction with school
composition, and access to the best schools.
11“The Broken Promises of Choice in New York City Schools”, New York Times, May 5th, 2017.
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The situation in NYC has reached a point where there are talks of doing away with
school priorities, and instead instituting a lottery. In fact, Professor Eric Nadelstern
at Columbia University, who served as deputy school chancellor when the new school
choice system was implemented, has recently proposed that children be allowed to
apply to any school, and have a lottery deciding the allocations.12
Given the absence of a direct connection between priorities and outcomes, and
the situation in NYC, we propose the use of endowments to control children’s rights.
This makes Nadelstern’s proposal compatible with school choice. We imagine that
there is a lottery that gives an initial probabilistic allocation of children to schools.
The lottery could be as simple as giving each child the same chance of attending
any school. It could also reflect different objectives in controlled school choice,
such as giving each child a higher chance of attending his or her neighborhood
school, or giving each minority child a chance (literally, a positive probability) of
attending the highest-ranked schools. The initial allocation, or endowment, provides
transparent and immediate reservation utility. A child who is endowed with a seat
at her neighborhood school can simply choose to attend that school. His or her right
to attend that school does not depend on other children in any way.
The initial allocation is typically not the final allocation, because we want pref-
erences to play a role. We assume that children use expected utilities to compare
lotteries and ask them to report vNM utilities of schools. For convenience, we may
use normalization by requiring each child to assign utility 1 to his favorite school
and assign utility 0 to the worst school. To capture the desired bounds on the
composition of a school, we can use quantity constraints. Subject to constraints,
our solution achieves all the desirable properties. The final allocation will be fair,
efficient, and individually rational.
Beyond school choice, our model and results can apply to other market design
problems. An example is time bank where agents exchange labor without using
transfer (see Andersson, Csehz, Ehlers, Erlanson, et al. (2018)). In that problem
every agent demands others’ services and also provides services to others. The
services an agent can supply are her endowments, and define her reservation utility.
12“Confronting Segregation in New York City Schools”, New York Times, May 15th, 2017.
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8. Proof of Theorems 1 and 3
We prove Theorem 3 in this section. The first two statements of Theorem 1 are
corollaries. We prove the third statement of Theorem 1 in Section 10 after proving
Theorem 2 in the next section.
For any given ε > 0, define
A∗ = {x ∈ AC : x is ε-individually rational}.
It is easy to see that A∗ is nonempty and compact.
Let the N -dimensional simplex ∆ be the domain of welfare weights.
For any λ ∈ ∆, define
φ(λ) = argmax{
∑
i∈I
λiui(xi)− δ
∑
i∈I
‖xi − 1‖ : (xi)i∈I ∈ A
∗},
where 1 is a vector of ones and δ > 0 is small enough such that
δmax
x∈A∗
∑
i∈I
‖xi − 1‖ < ε.
Since all ui are continuous and concave and
∑
i∈I ‖x
i−1‖ is continuous and strictly
convex, the objective function
∑
i∈I λ
iui(xi) − δ
∑
i∈I ‖x
i − 1‖ is continuous and
strictly concave. Moreover, A∗ is compact. Thus, φ : ∆→ A∗ is a function (meaning
it is singleton-valued), and, by the Maximum Theorem, continuous. Moreover, the
choice of δ implies that φ is ε-Pareto optimal.
For any agent i, define
Λi = {λ ∈ ∆ : ∄j ∈ I s.t i has equal-type ε-justified envy towards j at φ(λ)}.
The proof relies on an application of the so-called KKM Lemma (the lemma is
due to Knaster, Kuratowski and Mazurkiewicz; see Theorem 5.1 in Border (1989)).
In the following two lemmas we prove that {Λi}Ni=1 is a KKM covering of the simplex
∆. This means that every Λi is closed and that for any λ ∈ ∆ there is at least one
Λi such that λi > 0 and λ ∈ Λi.
Lemma 1. For every i ∈ I, Λi is closed.
Proof. Let λn be a sequence in Λ
i such that λn → λ ∈ ∆. Let xn = φ(λn). By
continuity of φ, xn → x = φ(λ) ∈ A
∗. Now we prove that λ ∈ Λi, that is, i does not
have equal-type ε-justified envy towards any other agent. Suppose that there is an
agent j of equal type with i such that ui(xj) > ui(xi) and uj(xi) > u˜j − ε. Since i
and j are of equal type, xi↔j ∈ A
C, and (xn)i↔j ∈ A
C for every n. By continuity of
22 ECHENIQUE, MIRALLES, AND ZHANG
ui and uj, for n large enough we have ui(xjn) > u
i(xin) and u
j(xin) > u˜
j − ε. These
mean that i has equal-type ε-justified envy towards j at xn, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, λ ∈ Λi and Λi is closed. 
Lemma 2. For every λ ∈ ∆, λ ∈ ∪i∈supp(λ)Λ
i.
Proof. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that for some λ ∈ ∆, λ /∈ ∪i∈supp(λ)Λ
i.
Let x = φ(λ). Then for every i ∈ supp(λ) there exists some j of equal type with i
such that ui(xj) > ui(xi) and uj(xi) > u˜j − ε.
Suppose first that there exist some i and j in the aforementioned situation such
that j /∈ supp(λ). Then consider the allocation y = xi↔j ∈ A
C. y is ε-individually
rational as x was ε-individually rational and uj(xi) > uj(ωj)− ε. Note that λj = 0
and ui(xj) > ui(xi) imply that
∑
h∈I λ
huh(xh) <
∑
h∈I λ
huh(yh). We also have that∑
h∈I ‖x
h − 1‖ =
∑
h∈I ‖y
h − 1‖, hence∑
h∈I
λhuh(xh)− δ
∑
h∈I
‖xh − 1‖ <
∑
h∈I
λhuh(yh)− δ
∑
h∈I
‖yh − 1‖.
But it contradicts the definition of x = φ(λ).
The above argument means that every i ∈ supp(λ) has equal-type ε-justified envy
towards some j ∈ supp(λ). Then, since the set of agents in supp(λ) is finite, there
must exist a subset of distinct agents {i1, . . . iK} ⊆ supp(λ) such that i1 has equal-
type ε-justified envy towards i2, i2 has equal-type ε-justified envy towards i3, and
so on until iK has equal-type ε-justified envy towards i1. Then we can construct
a new allocation y by letting agents in the cycle exchange their allocations. Since
the agents in the cycle are of equal type, y must be feasible, that is, y ∈ AC.13 As
before, we have that
∑
h∈I ‖x
h − 1‖ =
∑
h∈I ‖y
h − 1‖ because y is obtained from x
by permuting the assignments of agents in the cycle. Then we have∑
h∈I
λhuh(xh)− δ
∑
h∈I
‖xh − 1‖ <
∑
h∈I
λhuh(yh)− δ
∑
h∈I
‖yh − 1‖.
As before, it is a contradiction. 
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof is an application of the KKM lemma: see Theorem
5.1 in Border (1989).
13We can consider a sequence of allocations {x(k)}K−1k=0 with x(0) = x and x(k) = xik↔ik+1(k−1)
for each 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. Since all agents in the cycle are of equal type, each x(k) ∈ AC . We let
y = x(K − 1).
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By Lemmas 1 and 2, {Λi}ni=1 is a KKM covering of ∆. So there exists λ
∗
ε ∈ ∩
n
i=1Λ
i.
Let x∗ε = φ(λ
∗
ε). Then x
∗
ε is ε-individually rational, ε-Pareto optimal and has no
equal-type ε-justified envy.
Now let {εn} be a sequence such that εn > 0 for all n and εn → 0. Let x
∗
n be the
allocation found above for each εn. Since the sequence {x
∗
n} is bounded, it has a
subsequence {x∗nk} that converges to some x
∗. Since the set of feasible allocations
is closed, x∗ is a feasible allocation. We prove that x∗ is individually rational, weak
Pareto optimal and has no strong equal-type justified envy.
Since ui(x∗ink) ≥ u˜
i − εnk for all nk and all i, in the limit u
i(x∗i) ≥ u˜i for all i.
So x∗ is individually rational. Suppose x∗ is not weak Pareto optimal, then there
exists a feasible allocation y such that ui(yi) > ui(x∗i) for all i. For big enough
nk, u
i(yi) > ui(x∗ink) + εnk for all i, which contradicts the εnk-Pareto optimality of
x∗nk . Suppose some agent i has strong equal-type justified-envy towards another
agent j in x∗; that is, ui(x∗j) > ui(x∗i) and uj(x∗i) > u˜j. Then for big enough nk,
ui(x∗jnk) > u
i(x∗ink) and u
j(x∗ink) > u˜
j − εnk . But given that i and j are of equal type,
this contradicts the property of no equal-type εnk-justified envy of x
∗
nk
. 
9. Proof of Theorem 2
We let the L-dimensional simplex ∆L be the domain of prices.
9.1. Incomes. The key to the theorem is to carefully construct price-dependent
income functions. For each consumer i, define i’s expenditure function as
ei(v, p) = inf{p · x : ui(x) ≥ v},
for p ∈ ∆L and v ∈ R.
Let vi = sup ui(C i) be the utility of agent i when she is satiated.
For any scalar m ≥ 0 and p ∈ ∆L, let
µi(m, p) = median({ei(u˜i, p), m, ei(vi, p)}).
Consider the function
ϕ(m, p) =
∑
i
µi(m, p)− p ·Q.
Observe that
• ei(u˜i, p) ≤ ei(vi, p).
• µi is continuous and m 7→ µi(m, p) weakly monotone increasing.
• ϕ is continuous and m 7→ ϕ(m, p) weakly monotone increasing.
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• ϕ(m, p) ≤ 0 for m ≥ 0 small enough as
∑
i e
i(u˜i, p) ≤ p · Q (since an IR
allocation x exists, ei(u˜i, p) ≤ p · xi for all i, and
∑
i p · x
i = p ·Q.)
We shall define mi(p). First, in the case that
∑
i e
i(vi, p) < p ·Q, we let mi(p) =
ei(vi, p) + 1
N
[p · Q −
∑
i e
i(vi, p)]. Second, in the case that
∑
i e
i(vi, p) ≥ p · Q, we
have that ϕ(m, p) ≤ 0 for m ≥ 0 small enough, and ϕ(m, p) ≥ 0 for m ≥ 0 large
enough. Therefore there exists m∗ ≥ 0 with ϕ(m∗, p) = 0.
Now let mi(p) = µi(m∗, p). To show that this is well defined, we need to prove
that mi(p) is independent of the choice of m∗. To that end, suppose that there are
m1, m2 ∈ R+ with m1 6= m2 and 0 = ϕ(m1, p) = ϕ(m2, p). Suppose without loss
of generality that m1 < m2. Now, since each µ
i is weakly monotone increasing as a
function of m we must have µi(m1, p) = µ
i(m2, p) for all i. Then the definition of
mi(p) is the same regardless of whether we choose m1 or m2.
Note that, in all cases, p ·Q =
∑
im
i(p).
Lemma 3. mi is continuous.
Proof. Let pn → p ∈ ∆L. Note that if
∑
i e
i(vi, p) − p · Q < 0, then for n large
enough we will have
∑
i e
i(vi, pn) − pn · Q < 0. Then mi(pn) = ei(vi, pn) + 1
N
[pn ·
Q−
∑
i e
i(vi, pn)]→ ei(vi, p) + 1
N
[p ·Q−
∑
i e
i(vi, p)] = mi(p), by continuity of the
expenditure function.
So suppose that
∑
i e
i(vi, p)− p ·Q ≥ 0, and let m be such that ϕ(m, p) = 0. We
shall discuss two cases.
Case1: Consider the case that
∑
i e
i(vi, pnk) − pnk · Q < 0 for some subsequence
pnk . Then
∑
i e
i(vi, p)−p ·Q = 0. This means that if ϕ(m, p) = 0 then m ≥ ei(vi, p)
for all i. Hence mi(p) = ei(vi, p) for all i. But since mi(pnk) = ei(vi, pnk) + 1
N
[pnk ·
Q−
∑
i e
i(vi, pnk)], we get that mi(pnk)→ mi(p).
Case 2: Now turn to a subsequence pnk with
∑
i e
i(vi, pnk) − pnk · Q ≥ 0. Then
there is mnk with ϕ(mnk , pnk) = 0. We can take this sequence to be bounded:
consider any further convergent subsequence mn
′
k and say that mn
′
k → m′. Then
0 = ϕ(mn
′
k , pn
′
k) → ϕ(m′, p). Thus mi(pn
′
k) = µi(mn
′
k , pn
′
k) → µi(m′, p), as µi is
continuous. Since the sequence {mnk} is bounded, this implies that mi(pnk) →
mi(p).
Cases 1 and 2 exhaust all possible subsequences of pn. 
The role of the following lemma will be clear towards the end of the proof.
Lemma 4. If mi(p) < min{mj(p), ei(vi, p)} then mj(p) = ej(u˜j, p).
FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY 25
Proof. Since mi(p) < ei(vi, p), we must be in the case
∑
i e
i(vi, p) ≥ p · Q of the
definition of income functions. So let m∗ ≥ 0 with ϕ(m∗, p) = 0.
Since mi(p) = µi(m∗, p) < ei(vi, p), we must have m∗ ≤ mi(p). By hypothesis,
m∗ < mj(p). Then mj(p) = µj(m∗, p) implies that mj(p) = ej(u˜j, p). 
9.2. Existence of quasi-equilibrium. We first establish the existence of a quasiequi-
librium with p∗ 6= 0. The argument is similar to Gale and Mas-Colell (1975). See
also Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green, et al. (1995) (Chapter 17, Appendix B).
For any p ∈ ∆L, let di(p) be the set of vectors xi′ ∈ C i that satisfy the following
properties:
p · xi′ ≤ mi(p)
ui(xi′) ≥ ui(xˆi) for all xˆi ∈ C i with p · xˆi < mi(p).
We consider the correspondence p 7→ di(p) with domain in ∆L.
Observe that ∅ 6= argmax
xi′∈Ci
{ui(xi′) : p · xi′ ≤ mi(p)} ⊆ di(x, p)). So di takes non-
empty values.
Observe also that di is convex valued. To see this, let zi, yi ∈ di(p) and define
xi(α) = αzi + (1 − α)yi, for α ∈ [0, 1]. It is obvious that xi(α) ∈ C i and that
p · xi(α) ≤ mi(p). For any xˆi ∈ C i with p · xˆi < mi(p), min{ui(zi), ui(yi)} ≥ ui(xˆi)
and quasi-concavity of ui imply that ui(xi(α)) ≥ ui(xˆi). Thus xi(α) ∈ di(p).
A third observation is that di(p) is upper-hemicontinuous. To this end, consider
a sequence pn in ∆
L with pn → p ∈ ∆
L. Consider zin ∈ d
i(pn) such that z
i
n → z
i.
Clearly, zi ∈ C i and p · zi ≤ mi(p) as mi is continuous (Lemma 3). Moreover, for
any xˆi ∈ C i with p · xˆi < m
i(p), we have that pn · xˆi < m
i(pn) for n large enough
(again by Lemma 3). Thus ui(zin) ≥ u
i(xˆi) for n large enough, which by continuity
of ui implies that u(zi) ≥ ui(xˆi). Hence zi ∈ di(p).
For any x ∈ ×iC
i and p ∈ ∆L, let
π¯(x, p) = argmax{p ·
(∑
i
xi −Q
)
: p ∈ ∆L},
and consider the correspondence
ξ : ×iC
i ×∆L ։ ×iC
i ×∆L
defined by ξ(x1, . . . , xN , p) = (×id
i(p))× π¯(x, p).
By the previous observations, and the maximum theorem, ξ is in the hypotheses
of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Let (x∗, p∗) be a fixed point of ξ.
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We argue that (x∗, p∗) is a Walrasian quasiequilibrium. We have that p∗ · xi∗ ≤
mi(p∗) for every i, by construction of ξ. By definition of mi, we have
∑
im
i(p∗) =
p∗ · Q. Hence, p∗ · (
∑
i x
i∗ −Q) ≤ 0. This implies
∑
i x
i∗ − Q ≤ 0 since otherwise,
by definition of π¯, we would have
p∗ ·
(∑
i
xi∗ −Q
)
= max
p′∈∆L
{
p′ ·
(∑
i
xi∗ −Q
)}
> 0.
We show that
∑
i x
i∗ − Q = 0. We first consider the case
∑
i e
i(vi, p∗) < p∗ · Q.
By definition of mi, all agents i have mi(p∗) > ei(vi, p∗) so they must be satiated
following the definition of di. By monotonicity of preferences, we observe
∑
l x
i∗
l = c
i,
hence ∑
i
∑
l
xi∗l =
∑
i
ci ≥
∑
l
ql
where the inequality comes from the no overall excess supply assumption. Given
that we knew
∑
i x
i∗ −Q ≤ 0, we conclude
∑
i x
i∗ −Q = 0.
We then consider the case
∑
i e
i(vi, p∗) ≥ p∗ ·Q. We claim that p∗ ·xi∗ = mi(p∗) for
every i, since by definition of mi we have mi(p∗) ≤ ei(vi, p∗). Indeed, suppose that
p∗ · xi∗ < mi(p∗) ≤ ei(vi, p∗). Since xi∗ does not satiate the agent, for an arbitrarily
small ball B around xi∗ there is xi′ ∈ B with ui(xi′) > ui(xi∗) and p∗ · xi′ < mi(p∗),
contradicting xi∗ ∈ di(x∗, p∗). Observe that, as a consequence of the above,
(2) p∗ ·Q =
∑
i
mi(p∗) =
∑
i
p∗ · xi∗.
Consequently, p∗ · (
∑
i x
i∗ −Q) = 0. Since
∑
i x
i∗ − Q ≤ 0, we obtain p∗l = 0 for
any l with
∑
i x
∗i
l − ql < 0 (underdemanded objects). Then, since preferences are
monotonic, it is wlog to assume that
∑
i x
i∗ − Q = 0 by consuming the remaining
units of underdemanded objects for free.
This proves that (x∗, p∗) is a Walrasian quasiequilibrium.
9.3. Existence of equilibrium. We prove now that (x∗, p∗) is a Walrasian equi-
librium in the cases considered in the Theorem. In all cases we prove that, for
each agent i, either mi(p∗) > 0 or else the null bundle 0 is the only affordable
one. A standard argument follows converting such quasiequilibrium into an equilib-
rium. Suppose mi(p∗) > 0 and there exists yi ∈ Ci such that u
i(yi) > ui(xi∗) and
p∗ · yi ≤ mi(p∗). Then, for λ < 1 sufficiently close to 1, λyi ∈ Ci, p
∗ · λyi < mi(p∗)
and, by continuity of preferences, ui(λyi) > ui(xi∗), contradicting xi∗ ∈ di(p∗). For
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the remaining case mi(p∗) = 0, if 0 is the sole affordable bundle, then 0 = x∗i
trivially is i’s optimal choice subject to her budget constraint.
In all cases, we skip the possibility of
∑
i e
i(vi, p∗) < p∗ ·Q. By definition of mi, all
agents i would have mi(p∗) > ei(vi, p∗) so they would certainly be satiated following
the definition of di. Therefore we would trivially have an equilibrium. Note that,
by skipping such a possibility, we have p∗ · xi∗ = mi(p∗) for all i.
We first consider the case mini c
i >
∑
l ql. We show that p
∗ >> 0. Suppose, by
way of contradiction, that p∗l = 0 for some good l. Since p
∗·Q > 0 and
∑
i x
i∗−Q = 0,
there must be an individual j with p∗ ·xj∗ = mj(p∗) > 0. Take a vector δ containing
zeros in all coordinates but l, where it contains ǫ > 0. Notice that cj >
∑
l ql implies
xj∗ + δ ∈ C i for ǫ small enough. By monotonicity and continuity of preferences,
and since xj∗ + δ is also affordable, a standard argument shows that xj∗ is not
a quasiequilibrium allocation for j under prices p∗. We conclude that p∗ >> 0.
Consequently, for each agent i with mi(p∗) = 0, the 0 bundle is her only affordable
bundle.
We now consider the case when both Inada condition ui(xi) = ui(0) unless xi >> 0
and u˜i > ui(0) hold for all i. p∗ ∈ ∆L contains at least one strictly positive price,
thus mi(p∗) ≥ ei(u˜i, p∗) > 0 for all i.
Lastly, we consider the case that a common favorite object l and a strictly positive
IR allocation x˜ both exist. We argue that p∗l > 0. Suppose that p
∗
l = 0. Since
p∗ ∈ ∆L, there must be an object k 6= l with p∗k > 0. For any agent i who is consuming
object k, substituting his consumption of object k for an equal consumption of object
l saves expenses and increases utility. Hence xi∗ /∈ di(p∗). This contradiction shows
that p∗l > 0. Notice that, in consequence, e
i(vi, p∗) > 0 for all i.
Our next step is to establish that m = min{mi(p∗) : 1 ≤ i ≤ I} > 0. First, if
m = min{ei(vi, p∗) : 1 ≤ i ≤ I} then we are done because ei(vi, p∗) > 0 for all i.
Ruling out this case, there must exist i with mi(p∗) < ei(vi, p∗), which implies that∑
im
i(p∗) = p∗ ·Q =
∑
i p
∗ · x˜i. Now, if
(3) m = min{ei(u˜i, p∗) : 1 ≤ i ≤ I},
then there is h with m = mh(p∗) ≤ ei(u˜i, p∗) for all i; which implies by the definition
of the income functions that mi(p∗) = ei(u˜i, p∗) for all i. But ei(u˜i, p∗) ≤ p∗ · x˜i for
all i and ∑
i
ei(u˜i, p∗) =
∑
i
mi(p∗) = p∗ ·Q =
∑
i
p∗ · x˜i
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imply that ei(u˜i, p∗) = p∗ · x˜i for all i. So mi(p∗) = p∗ · x˜i for all i. Because x˜i >> 0,
mi(p∗) > 0 for all i.
Finally, if Equation (3) does not hold, then 0 ≤ min{ei(u˜i, p∗) : 1 ≤ i ≤ I} < m.
So mi(p∗) > 0 for all i.
9.4. Properties of a competitive equilibrium allocation x∗.
9.4.1. Pareto optimality. We disregard the case
∑
i e
i(vi, p∗) < p∗ ·Q in which clearly
every agent i is satiated since mi(p∗) > ei(vi, p∗). In the cases that follow below,
any satiated agent i must have mi(p∗) = ei(vi, p∗). Suppose that yi ∈ C i and that
ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi∗). Then we must have p∗ · yi ≥ mi(p∗) because otherwise p∗ · yi <
mi(p∗) ≤ ei(vi, p∗) and if i is satiated, then p∗ · yi < ei(vi, p∗) and ui(yi) ≥ vi
contradicts the definition of ei; if i is not satiated, there would exists zi with p∗ ·zi <
mi(p∗) and ui(zi) > ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi∗).
Obviously if yi ∈ C i and ui(yi) > ui(xi∗) then p∗ · yi > mi(p∗). So if y = (yi)
Pareto dominates x∗ then
∑
i p
∗ · yi >
∑
im
i(p∗). But by Equation (2) this is
impossible if y is an allocation.
9.4.2. Individual rationality. To show that x∗ is individually rational it suffices to
notice that mi(p∗) ≥ ei(u˜i, p∗) for all i.
9.4.3. No justified envy. Suppose that i envies j at x∗. This implies that i is not
satiated, hence mi(p∗) < ei(vi, p∗). It also implies that mi(p∗) < mj(p∗) as mi(p∗) <
p∗ · xj∗ ≤ mj(p∗). By Lemma 4, then, mj(p∗) = ej(u˜j, p∗).
We obtain that
p∗ · xi∗ = mi(p∗) < mj(p∗) = ej(u˜j, p∗),
and hence uj(xi) < u˜j by definition of expenditure function. So i’s envy is not
justified.
10. Proof of Theorem 1.3 and Corollary 1
10.1. Proof of Corollary 1. We denote a constant of Lipschitz continuity common
to all utility functions by θ. Let y be an IR allocation, which exists by assumption.
Consider an additional object e /∈ O, and an α-extended economy, for any α ∈ (0, 1),
with the capacity vector Qα:
qαl = (1− α)ql, ∀l ∈ O, and q
α
e = α
∑
i
ci.
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Preferences in this extended economy are defined to be:
U i((xl)l∈O, xe) = u
i((xl)l∈O) + θxe.
Notice that under this construction, e is a common favorite good in this extended
economy. By Lipschitz continuity, the allocation yα with yiαl = (1 − α)y
i
l for l ∈
O and yiαe = αci meets U
i(yαi ) > u˜
i for all i ∈ I. Therefore, by continuity of
preferences, for β > 0 low enough, the allocation βQα/N + (1 − β)yα is a strictly
positive IR allocation in the extended economy.
Therefore, by Theorem 2, each α-extended economy contains a Pareto-optimal,
IR and NJE allocation xα. We construct a sequence (xα)α where α tends to zero.
Wlog such sequence converges to some allocation x∗ (if not, a subsequence does.)
Such limit is an allocation in the original economy.
x∗ is weak Pareto optimal. Suppose not, then there is an allocation x′ that
strongly Pareto dominates x∗. Consider the allocation x′α in the α-extended econ-
omy where xi′αl = (1−α)x
i′
l for l ∈ O and x
i′
e = αci, for each i ∈ I. By continuity of
preferences and for low enough α, we have that x′α strongly Pareto dominates xα.
This contradicts that xα is Pareto optimal.
x∗ is IR, since U i(xαi ) ≥ u˜i for all i ∈ I and all α.
x∗ has no strong justified envy. Suppose not. Then, some agent i envies some
other agent j at x∗ and uj(xi∗) > u˜j. For α low enough, and by continuity of
preferences, i envies j at xα and U j(xiα) > u˜j. But this contradicts the fact that xα
satisfies NJE.
10.2. Proof of Theorem 1.3. Following the above proof and noticing that linear
utilities are Lipschitz continuous, we just need to show that, in this particular case,
x∗ constructed above is Pareto optimal instead of weak Pareto optimal.
Suppose that x∗ is not Pareto optimal. Let x′ be an allocation with x′e = 0 that
Pareto dominates x∗. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), consider
x′αε = x
α + ε(x′ − x∗),
and observe that x′αε → x
∗ + ε(x′ − x∗) as α→ 0.
By linearity of preferences, and the fact that x′ Pareto dominates x∗, we have
that U i(xi′αε ) ≥ U
i(xiα) for all i with at least one strict inequality. We have seen,
by Theorem 2, that each xα in the sequence is Pareto optimal in its corresponding
α-extended economy. Consequently, for any α and any ε ∈ (0, 1), x′αε cannot be an
allocation in its corresponding α-extended economy.
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Now, given that ∑
i
xi′αε =
∑
i
xiα + ε(
∑
i
xi′ −
∑
i
xi∗)
= Qα + ε(Q−Q) = Qα,
the market clearing aspect of being an allocation is met. So for x′αε not to be an
allocation it must be the case that, for every ε and α, there is at least one agent i
such that xi′αε /∈ C
i.
Observe that xi′αε /∈ C
i means that we are in one of two cases
(1)
∑
l x
i′α
εl > c
i, or
(2) xi′αεl < 0 for some l (or both).
Moreover, note by definition of x′αε that if we are in case (1) then we are in (1)
for any ε′ ≥ ε, and if we are in case (2) then we are in (2) for any ε′ ≥ ε.
Consider a sequence αt → 0 and an associated sequence of corresponding equilib-
rium allocations xαt → x∗. Let I1t be the set of agents i for whom x
i′αt
ε is in case (1)
for all ε ∈ (0, 1), and I2t be the set of agents i for whom x
i′αt
ε is in case (2) for all
ε ∈ (0, 1).
Given that for any ε ∈ (0, 1), no matter how small, there exists i with xi′αtε /∈ C
i
for all ε′ ≥ ε, and that the set of agents is finite, I1t ∪ I
2
t 6= ∅ for all t.
Suppose first that I1t 6= ∅ for infinitely many t. Again, since the set of agents is
finite, we can wlog assume that there exists a subsequence with the property that
I1t is invariant for all t large enough. Let I
∗ denote that invariant set. Select an
agent i∗ ∈ I∗. Then
ci
∗
<
∑
l
xi
∗′αt
εl =
∑
l
xi
∗αt
l + ε(
∑
l
xi
∗′
l −
∑
l
xi
∗∗
l )
for all ε means that
∑
l x
i∗αt
l = c
i∗ , as xi
∗αt
t ∈ C
i∗ . Since this is true for all t large
enough and xαt → x∗,
∑
l x
i∗∗
l = c
i∗ . Now, we must have
∑
l x
i∗′
l −
∑
l x
i∗∗
l > 0,
which implies that
∑
l x
i∗′
l > c
i∗ , contradicting that x′ is an allocation.
Suppose now that I1t = ∅ for all but finitely many t. Then I
2
t 6= ∅ for infinitely
many t. Again, since the set of agents is finite, we can wlog assume that there exists
a subsequence with the property that I2t = I
∗ 6= ∅ for all t large enough. Select an
agent i∗ ∈ I∗. Using the finiteness of the number of objects, there exists l with the
property that for all t large enough,
∀ε ∈ (0, 1), xi
∗αt
l + ε(x
i∗′
l − x
i∗∗
l ) = x
′i∗αt
εl < 0.
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Given that xi
∗
t ∈ Ci, this can only be true for all ε if x
i∗αt
l = 0, and x
i∗′
l − x
i∗∗
l < 0.
Now xαt → x∗ means that xi
∗∗
l = 0, so we have x
i∗′
l < 0, which contradicts that x
′
is an allocation.
11. Proof of Theorem 4
11.1. Theorem 1. To prove that the first two statements of Theorem 1 hold as
before when NJE is extended, we omit the steps in common and highlight the
differences from the previous proof. Let Λi be the set of all λ ∈ ∆ at which i has no
ε-justified envy by exchange towards any agent at φ(λ). We prove that the collection
of Λi is still a KKM covering of ∆.
Lemma 5. For every i ∈ I, Λi is closed.
Proof. Let λn be a sequence in Λ
i such that λn → λ ∈ ∆. Let xn = φ(λn). By
continuity of φ, xn → x = φ(λ) ∈ A
∗. Now we prove that λ ∈ Λi, that is, i does
not have ε-justified envy by exchange towards any other agent at φ(λ). Suppose
that this is not the case. Then i has ε-justified envy by exchange towards some
agent j, with the sequence (ik)
K
k=1 being as in the definition of such envy. By
continuity of utility, and since the sequence (ik)
K
k=1 is finite, for n large enough we
have uik(x
ik+1
n ) > uik(xikn ) for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 while u
iK(xi1n ) > u˜
iK − ε. So i has
ε-justified envy by exchange towards j at xn, which is a contradiction. Therefore,
λ ∈ Λi and Λi is closed. 
Lemma 6. For every λ ∈ ∆, λ ∈ ∪i∈supp(λ)Λ
i.
Proof. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that for some λ ∈ ∆, λ /∈ ∪i∈supp(λ)Λ
i.
Let x = φ(λ). Then for every i ∈ supp(λ), there exists some j such that i has ε-
justified envy by exchange towards j at x. Suppose first that there exists such j, with
corresponding sequence (ik)
K
k=1, in which λ
iK = 0. Let y be the allocation obtained
from x by letting each ik get x
ik+1 (1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1) and iK get x
i. Clearly y is ε-IR,
as x was ε-IR and uiK(xi) > u˜iK − ε. Note that λiK = 0 and uik(yik) > uik(xik) for
all 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 imply that
∑
h∈I λ
huh(xh) <
∑
h∈I λ
huh(yh). We also have that∑
h∈I ‖x
h − 1‖ =
∑
h∈I ‖y
h − 1‖, hence∑
h∈I
λhuh(xh)− δ
∑
h∈I
‖xh − 1‖ <
∑
h∈I
λhuh(yh)− δ
∑
h∈I
‖yh − 1‖,
which contradicts the definition of x = φ(λ).
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The above argument means that every i ∈ supp(λ) has ε-justified envy by ex-
change towards some agent j, with corresponding sequence (ik)
K
k=1 in which λ
iK > 0.
Thus, iK ∈ supp(λ). But it means that iK also has ε-justified envy by exchange
towards some agent j′, with corresponding sequence (i′k)
K
k=1 in which λ
i′
K > 0.
Since the set of agents in supp(λ) is finite, there must exist a subset of agents
{h1, . . . hM} ⊆ supp(λ) such that h1 has ε-justified envy by exchange towards some
agent with h2 being the end of the corresponding sequence, h2 has ε-justified envy
by exchange towards some agent with h3 being the end of the corresponding se-
quence, and so on until hM has ε-justified envy by exchange towards some agent
with h1 being the end of the corresponding sequence. We write this situation as the
following cycle
h1 → · · · → h2 → · · · → h3 → · · · → · · · → hM → · · · → h1,
where a → b means that a envies b, and hk → · · · → hk+1 is the corresponding
sequence of hk’s ε-justified envy by exchange towards some agent. Now note that
if an agent h appears more than once in the above cycle, we can shorten the cycle
by skipping the agents between any two consecutive positions of h in the cycle. So
we can, without loss of generality, focus on the cycle in which each agent appears
once. If we carry out the exchange in the cycle as in the proof of Lemma 2, then we
obtain an improvement on the objective that defines φ. This is a contradiction. 
The remaining part of the proof is same as before.
11.2. Theorem 2. Let (x, p) be an equilibrium in Theorem 2. Suppose some agent
i has justified envy by exchange towards some agent j, with the sequence (ik)
K
k=1
being as in the definition of such envy. By our construction of income functions,
mi(p) < mj(p) < mi2(p) < · · · < miK (p). So it must be that miK (p) = eiK (u˜iK , p).
It means that xi is not acceptable to iK , which is a contradiction. So x satisfies no
justified envy by exchange. Then the third statement of Theorem 1 can be proved
as before.
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